Hank the Nazi Skank

His Bathtub Runneth Over

presented by
DBGB OMFUCK

Henry Nuesslein aka Hank the Skank

Nobody Wants A Skank In their Tank

Hank the Skank is A Rectal Dweller, A Lowlife and A Pedophile

Hank the Skank Nuesslein (aka Henry Little Nut) is a rather unusual character who now resides at 32-19 75th Street, Queens, NY 11370
(be sure to send subscriptions to the above address non-stop) hung out on the fringes of New York city's counterculture. Hank who claims he is "Brother Bopp" on the Howard Stern Show gained access to the scene via his infiltration of Pirate Editions in the 70's . (They published STEAL THIS BOOK by Abbie Hoffman.

Hank also worked for the NY Telephone co. Soon Hank began to reveal his true colors via his sexist attitudes...He would sexually harass 10 year old girls with obscene phone calls.....along with placing stickers on pay phones advertising the yippies phone number to be that of a sperm bank.

Well we always knew Hank was an oddball....
we didnt realize the ramifications of the presence of such a skanky individual.The skank turned out to be a jinx causing AJ Weberman to get jumped twice at Central Park.Skank also had the audacity to name himself ,"the king of sodom and gomorrah day"-an event he held in washington Square Park which turned out to be an exhibitionists "flash your tits" bash on a saturday afternoon in the park. Hank exposed his privates so as to make himself "king".

His incompetence caused a fire to break out at Studio 10-the yippie rock club...In fact we purged the Skank when Alice T of 9 Bleecker St caught Hank pilfering 2-3 six packs of Heinekens. They were to be sold by the club!!! Hank embezzled club funds in a defacto manner. As a result, Hank was purged...
as a result, Hank sets up the Jelly Bread co-op asa countergroup to the yippies....
Anyway, the skank got busted in March 1995 due to having a bomb factory in his apartment. He just got paroled (ironically when Bush was elected )after doing 4 years in the state prison system.

The New York Law Journal March 11, 1996 SUPREME COURT _______________________________________________________________ ----)----

CRIMINAL TERM, PART 4 Justice Ferdinand

* PEOPLE v. HENRY NUESSLEIN-

Law Journal EXTRA! KINGS COUNTY

Supreme Court Criminal Term, Part 42 Justice D. Friedman

New York Law Journal (p. 30, col. 5) October 12, 1995

CASE SUMMARY PREPARED BY A NYLJ STAFF EDITOR

DEFENDANT ARRESTED for possessing explosive devices, assault weapons and handguns moved to have the court recuse itself. He asserted there had been media coverage identifying him as a Nazi and a racist and that the Orthodox Jewish judge would be unable to preside impartially over the trial. The court ruled recusal was not warranted, as defendant could not point to any interlocutory ruling reflecting bias, and unfairness could not be implied by simply pointing to a judge's religious belief.

[FULL TEXT OF DECISION FOLLOWS]

PEOPLE v. HENRY NUESSLEIN*1--This criminal action has its genesis in the arrest of defendant for criminal possession of several explosive devices, assault weapons, and handguns. The items were confiscated during a search of defendant's apartment in Brooklyn. Defendant asserts that during the search the police also seized books on Hitler, which the People intend to use as evidence to portray him as a ``Nazi and a racist -- a right wing Oklahoma- type bomber'' and that there has been extensive media coverage to that effect. Defendant has moved pursuant to 22 NYCRR 100.2, 100.3 and Canon 2 of the Code on Judicial Conduct for an order asking me to recuse myself. He alleges that because I am an Orthodox Jew I will be unable to preside impartially over the trial in that I will inevitably be influenced by ``subtle pressure from the Jewish community.'' He claims further that I have already demonstrated bias by certain interlocutory rulings in that I removed his Legal Aid attorney and required him to retain counsel, I did not provide him sufficient time to obtain counsel of his choosing, I refused to grant an adjournment when defendant informed the court that a demonstration against him was planned, and I ordered him to submit his omnibus motion prior to the expiration of the 45 day period permitted for the making of such a motion. Resolution of defendant's recusal motion requires addressing two issues. One is whether rulings made by a judge while a case is pending before him may furnish a basis for recusal. The second is whether a judge's religious belief warrants his recusal. Consideration of the first issue involves a rule frequently referred to as the extrajudicial source rule. In regard to recusal this rule provides that, alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge has learned from his participation in the case. (People v. Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 407). A corollary to this rule is that neither the formation of an opinion on a question of law nor judicial rulings in a case constitute grounds for a charge of bias or prejudice on the judge (Weiner v. Savarese, 109 NYS2d 14, app. dism. 112 NYS2d 772; see generally, 28 NY Jur2d, Courts and Judges, Sec. 109). Thus insofar as defendant points to my rulings during the pendency of the case as showing bias and warranting my recusal, extrajudicial source analysis would mandate denial of his motion. The foregoing does not, however, complete discussion of the matter because it does not reflect the current status of the extrajudicial source rule. The Court of Appeals in People v. Moreno, supra, citing to the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Grinnel Corp. (384 US 563) and United States v. Berger (255 US 22) appeared to adopt the extrajudicial source rule of Federal jurisprudence for this state. Subsequent to Moreno, however, the Supreme Court in Litkey v. U.S. (-- U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 1147) clarified Grinnel and Berger and modified the extrajudicial source rule. In this respect the Court indicated that the presence or absence of an extrajudicial source of bias or prejudice is not the sine qua non of the inquiry on a recusal motion. This arises from the fact that the presence of an extrajudicial source does not necessarily establish bias nor does the absence of an extrajudicial source necessarily preclude bias. Thus under Litkey defendant could not point to my rulings during the pendency of the case to support his motion. It follows that I must examine the rulings he points to in determining whether there is reason for recusal. Defendant's initial allegation is that I removed his Legal Aid attorney and did not provide him with sufficient time to employ and consult with a new attorney. This allegation is an extraordinary and gross misstatement of the record. The facts are that defendant's Legal Aid attorney was ordered removed because of financial ability to pay before the case was even assigned to my part. Removal was ordered by the judge presiding in Part ACA 360. Interestingly, insofar as I can ascertain from the record defendant's Legal Aid attorney herself recognized the need for and inevitability of her removal. As to the time afforded defendant to obtain counsel, I adjourned the matter three times for defendant to retain counsel and he was given approximately a month for that purpose. As to the other allegations, they too are devoid of merit. First, while it is true that defense counsel informed the court that a demonstration was planned in front of the courthouse she failed to indicate what prejudice could result from such a demonstration. On the subject day the matter was only scheduled for a calendar call to establish a motion schedule. Second, this court did not impermissibly shorten the period of time for defendant to make motions (Matter of Veloz v. Rothwax, 65 NY2d 902). While the court did schedule a return date for defendant's motion less than 45 days from counsel's entry into the case, it was specifically indicated that if defendant could not have his motion ready on that date an application for further time would be entertained. In fact further time was granted. What emerges is that defendant cannot point to any ruling reflecting such bias as could conceivably justify recusal. Hence, he is left to his alternative theory that recusal is warranted because of my religious belief. Part and parcel of that contention is that my religious belief carries with it an antipathy to Nazis which will infect my actions vis-a-vis defendant who has been identified as a ``Nazi and a racist -- Oklahoma-type bomber.'' Defendant ultimately fails, however, to recognize that ``[a]ll judges come to the bench with a background of experiences, associations and viewpoints. This background alone is seldom sufficient in itself to provide a reasonable basis for recusal'' (Brody v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F2d 10, 11; see also, United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F.Supp. 955; Menora v. Illinois High School Association, 527 F.Supp. 632; Blank v. Sullivan and Cromwell, 418 F.Supp. 1; State of Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F.Supp. 706; Matter of Cromwell, 418 F.Supp. 1; State of Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F.Supp. 706; Pashall v. Mayone, 454 F.Supp. 1289; compare, Matter of Cohen v. Cohen, 172 AD2d 522). These cases make clear that bias cannot reasonably be implied by simply pointing to a judge's religious, ethnic, racial, or employment background (People v. Ranieri, 149 Misc.2d 948). For bias or prejudice to warrant recusal it must be demonstrated that it is of the pejorative kind (Litkey v. US, supra). On this subject the Supreme Court noted in Litkey that, ``[o]ne would not say that . . . world opinion is biased or prejudiced against Adolf Hitler. The words [bias and prejudice] cannote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought to possess . . . or because it is excessive in degree'' (Litkey v. United States, -- US --, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, supra). Thus the conclusion that evolves is that a judge's unfavorable disposition towards the subject of Nazism and recism is not a disqualifying view so long as it not so extreme as to display an inability, whether real or apparent, to render fair judgment. Granting the defendant his claim that I am unfavorably disposed towards Nazism, and bombers, and bearing in mind what constitutes bias in the recusal context, it is clear that defendant has failed to demonstrate a basis for recusal. Rather defendant merely points to the general observation that I (like my colleagues) find Nazism, racisim, and those who would bomb innocent people reprehensible. Defendant fails, however, to point to any identifiable fact demonstrating that on these matters my views as an Orthodox Jew are somehow different than those of society at large, or any of my colleagues, regardless of their religious backgrounds. More significantly, there has been no showing of a lack, or even an apparent lack, of ability by me to render fair judgment. It follows that his motion must be denied.

notes (1) This opinion explains my order rendered on the record on July 18, 1995 denying defendant's recusal motion.

-Defendant was indicted and charged with three counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the First Degree, nine counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree, thirteen counts of Possession of a Rifle or Shotgun in violation of the Administrative Code of City of New York, and Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, predicated upon the seizure of three improvised explosive devices, twelve rifles, three firearms, three switchblade knives and two cane swords from his home. The Court held a Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearing on November 29 and 30, and December 1 and 11, 1995, at which the People called ten witnesses. A videotape of the defendant's apartment was received in evidence along with photographs and other documents. The Court credits the testimony of the police witnesses and based upon the credible evidence makes the following finding of fact. Findings of Fact On March 19, 1995, Police Officers Ronald Giammarino and Lisa Bolusi were working together on routine uniformed patrol in a marked police car when, at about 2:00 p.m., they received a radio communication directing them to 5901 Tenth Avenue in Brooklyn concerning a landlord tenant dispute. Upon arriving at that location the officers were met by a man who identified himself as Mr. Lupo, the building superintendent. Mr. Lupo explained that because there was a bad leak in one of the apartments, he needed to gain access into the upstairs apartment which he believed to be the source of the water leakage. The officers informed Mr. Lupo that first they needed to evaluate the severity of the problem and he led them to apartment 3A on the first floor of the building. In the bathroom of that apartment, the officers observed a steady stream of water that flowed from a light fixture on the ceiling, and a large amount of water that had collected on the walls and in buckets on the floor. The officers then accompanied Mr. Lupo to apartment 3B, a unit located directly above the leak. After knocking on the door several times and getting no response, Mr. Lupo gave the officers the key and explained that he did not want to enter on his own because he had problems with Henry Nuesslein, the tenant of the apartment, in the past and was afraid of him. When the door was opened, Officer Giammarino entered first, followed by Officer Bolusi. Each of the officers immediately saw nine hand grenades that were hanging on the archway near the entrance to the apartment. Officer Giammarino observed that five of the grenades had holes bored in the bottom, indicating to him the possibility that these grenades might be souvenirs and not active weapons. Officer Giammarino was unable to see the condition of the remaining grenades. The officers continued into the dimly lit apartment which smelled strongly of ammonia and burnt marijuana, and was filled with trash. Papers, newspapers, books, boxes, clothing, garbage, and other debris covered nearly every surface and were scattered all about the apartment, thereby obscuring the floor and furniture. In some places the mounds of rubbish were piled two feet in height. Using his flashlight, Officer Giammarino led the way and the officers headed in the direction of the bathroom, which they believed to be the source of the leak. Officer Giammarino observed numerous books and magazines about war and Hitler with Nazi emblems on shelves and counter tops. Because of the grenades, the noxious odor, the dim light, the subject matter of the literature, and the excessive debris, the officers proceeded cautiously, taking care where they stepped, and looking all around them. As Officer Giammarino shined the flashlight into the bedroom, both officers saw numerous metal boxes of the type used to store ammunition on the floor and an AK47 rifle with a clip in it on the bed. In addition, Officer Bolusi saw a Glock 9 millimeter handgun on the floor near the bed. At that point, and without having touched anything inside the apartment, the officers became nervous and began to back out of the apartment. As they exited and closed the front door of the apartment, they heard a high pitched beeping sound. The beeps were at regular intervals and grew progressively quicker in time. Fearing that the beeps emanated from a detonating device, the officers quickly ordered Mr. Lupo and others to evacuate the building. >From across the street, the officers contacted the Emergency Service Unit of the New York City Police Department. Thereafter, at about 2:50 p.m., Police Officers Edward Vandenberg and Nicholas Massab of the Emergency Service Unit, arrived at the building in response to a report of possible explosive devices. After speaking with the precinct officers, the ESU officers entered apartment 3B wherein they immediately observed the nine hand grenades on the wall above the archway, and removed and inspected them. Despite the holes in the grenades, Officer Vandenberg was uncertain of their volatility and notified the bomb squad to come to the location to determine whether they were active. The ESU officers continued into the apartment to ascertain the existence of additional explosive devices. The ESU officers proceeded into the bedroom which was in the same state of disarray as the other rooms -- a jumble of boxes, books, clothing, and other debris piled so high that the bed was obscured and difficult to discern. In the bedroom Officer Massab seized the AK47 rifle and secured it by unloading the ammunition. As he picked up the rifle, Officer Massab saw the butt of another rifle which he also seized, checked its state of load, and secured. Then Officer Vandenberg retrieved the Glock 9 millimeter handgun which he made safe by removing a magazine containing several cartridges. Officer Vandenberg next found several handguns and a shotgun on the bed and he also examined each of the metal boxes of ammunition which were each labeled with the caliber or type of bullet it contained. Officer Massab found explosive powder, a cannon fuse, and percussion caps inside a separate box. Officer Massab also found an explosive device inside a box that consisted of a sock which held a M100 firecracker with an attached fuse, and a hose clamp, and several nails. Some of the items seized from the bedroom were openly visible while others became visible as the officers disturbed the debris to secure and recover the ammunition, weapons and explosive devices. Eventually the ESU officers conducted a thorough search of the bedroom, moving pieces of debris in search of other incendiary devices and discovering numerous handguns, rifles, three explosive devices, and thousands of ammunition rounds. When their tour of duty ended, Officers Vandenberg and Massab were replaced by ESU Officers Anthony Mangiaracina and Richardson, who continued the search of the apartment along with Officers Dominick Janetti and Damion Gilsenan of the 66th precinct. During this search they located numerous weapons, including about ten rifles, an air pistol and a dirk, in the living room of the apartment. While they were present Detective Robert Mladinick came into the apartment and he observed five manuals on the chemistry and principles of explosive devices and homemade bombs. Detective Mladinick set aside these books and directed that they be removed along with the other seized items. Police Officers Laura Stremel and Richardson McDonald waited outside the apartment building and at about 8:00 p.m., they saw a person who matched the description they had been given of Henry Nuesslein, the tenant of apartment 3B. The officers approached the defendant and upon confirmation of his name and address, he was placed under arrest. Officer Stremel recalled the defendant saying that the items in his apartment could be purchased at any store or in any magazine. Officer McDonald could not recall defendant making any statement. Earlier that afternoon, Officer Bolusi went to the Office of the District Attorney and provided the information with which the People obtained a search warrant that was signed at about 8:00 p.m. Conclusions of Law Defendant moves for suppression of all the physical evidence seized from his apartment on the grounds that the warrantless search of his home was unreasonable in that the People failed to establish an emergency circumstance to justify the police entry and subsequent recovery of evidence. It is undisputed that the police entered the home of the defendant without a warrant, searched it, and seized from it the many weapons which form the basis of the instant charges. Although a search warrant was ultimately obtained, the items had already been removed from the apartment by the police before its signing. The police are prohibited from searching a person's home without a warrant unless a specific circumstance makes the search reasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971). No warrant is required when emergency or exigent circumstances present an immediate danger to life or property. People v. Calhoun, 49 NY2d 398, 403 (1980); People v. Doerbecker, 39 NY2d 448, 451-52 (1976). The emergency exception to the warrant requirement is narrowly construed to prevent the police from searching a person's home on the pretext of protecting property in order to look for evidence of a crime. Thus, ''a warrantless intrusion ... is presumptively unreasonable ... [and] the burden of justifying it'' must be borne by the People. People v. Calhoun, 49 NY2d supra at 401; People v. Knapp, 52 NY2d 689 (1981). In determining whether exigent circumstances exist so as to permit a warrantless entry and search of an individual's home, three factors must be present: first, the police must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency at hand which requires their assistance for the protection of life and property; second, the search must be motivated by an intent to abate the hazard and not to gather evidence of criminality; and third, there must be a reasonable basis to connect the area to be searched with the emergency. People v. Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-78 (1976). Additionally, the reasonableness of the search and seizure depends on the circumstances of the hazard, the immediacy of the perceived danger, and the scope of the search in relationship to the exigency. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 US 287, 298 (1984); see generally, People v. Lenart, 91 AD2d 132 (2d Dept. 1983). The initial entry of defendant's home by the police was justified by the emergency created by a leak that emanated from the defendant's apartment. A water leakage, like a gas leak or an outbreak of fire, constitutes an emergency situation which justifies a warrantless entry by the police into private premises. See generally, People v. Gallmon, 19 NY2d supra at 392-93; People v. Guins, 165 AD2d 549, 552 (4th Dept. 1991); People v. Johnson, 48 Misc 2d (Sup Ct, NY County 1965). Having entered the first floor apartment and observed the extensive amount of water leaking through the ceiling, the police had reasonable cause to believe that an emergency condition existed in the defendant's apartment and that there was an immediate need for them to assist the landlord in entering the defendant's apartment to protect property. Moreover, there was no evidence that the officers were motivated to enter the apartment by an intent to make an arrest or to seize evidence. Nor was there any evidence that the water leak was pretextual. Although the landlord had a key to the defendant's apartment, he offered a reasonable explanation for his request that the police accompany him. In discharging their public safety obligation, the officers lawfully acted as an agent of the landlord, who had summoned them in distress. See generally, People v. Gallmon, 19 NY2d 389, 394-95 (1967). Thus, the water leak created an exigent circumstance which justified the initial warrantless entry into the defendant's apartment. Once inside the apartment Officers Giammarino and Bolusi were confronted by grenades, guns, numerous boxes of ammunition, and books about war which were in plain view. Because the initial entry which brought the officers within plain view of the contraband and possibly destructive devices was supported by the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, the officers could have justifiably seized those items before summoning the ESU officers. See generally, People v. Green, 103 AD2d 362, 367 (2d Dept. 1984). A police officer may seize what is in plain view when he is lawfully in a position to observe the items, the discovery of the items is inadvertent,1 and it is immediately apparent to the officer that the items seized are evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971); see also, People v. Wilson, 191 AD2d 528 (2d Dept. 1993); People v. Barrows, 170 AD2d 611 (2d Dept. 1991). However, recognizing that they did not possess the requisite expertise to examine and disarm the devices, the officers evacuated the building and requested assistance from their colleagues. The exigency associated with the leak that justified the original warrantless entry was enhanced by the observations of weapons and the beeping sound which suggested a possible detonating device and escalated the perceived danger. Thus the totality of the circumstances created an exigent circumstance, apart from the water leak, which independently justified the continued efforts by the police to investigate and abate the hazard. See, United States v. Callabrass, 607 F2d 559, 563-64 (2d Cir. 1979). These officers were lawfully in the apartment because of the exigency created by the overt presence of grenades, guns, and ammunition, whose incriminating nature was readily apparent. Similarly, the warrantless entry and search by the ESU officers was justified by the volatile objects that were prone to accidental or intentional destruction. Thereafter, the retrieval of the grenades, ammunition, and weapons by the ESU officers caused a rippling effect in that the discovery and recovery of each item revealed additional weapons and explosive devices. These events escalated the potential danger of the situation and permitted the officers to amplify their investigative and protective efforts to locate additional explosive devices and eliminate danger to public safety. United States v. Callabrass, 607 F2d supra at 564. Thus, the investigatory efforts of the ESU officers, which began with the seizure of potentially explosive items in plain view, was permissible. When the bombs and explosive powder were discovered in socks and boxes in the bedroom, the search was lawfully expanded to include a full blown search of the entire apartment in order to insure the safety of the officers and the public. The multiple entries by the ESU and precinct officers was part and parcel of the initial investigatory efforts relating to the explosive devices. As such, each entry into the defendant's apartment was justified because the danger of explosion was continuous and prompt action was required to secure these items. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the presence of the destructive devices did not allow for the delay entailed in securing a warrant without endangering lives and property. The delay attendant upon obtaining a warrant could have jeopardized the safety of the public and the officers. Thus, under these facts, all of the officers who entered the defendant's apartment were ''charged with responsibility for protecting the public safety'' and were justified in moving rapidly without a warrant ''to ward off foreseeable imminent violence with attendant risk of a serious breach of the peace and possible injury 'to innocent members of the public.'' People v. Doerbecker, 39 NY2d supra at 452. In view of the on-going nature of the possible danger to the residents of the building and surrounding neighbornood as well as to officers themselves, the scope of the search and seizure of evidence was reasonable and prompt action was necessary to protect life and property against the risks if such explosive contraband were put to its intended use. Id. Accordingly, the warrantless entries by the ESU and precinct officers were permissible given the exigencies of the situation, and the search and recovery of evidence were justified in light of the nature and degree of urgency resulting from the existence of potential explosive devices. Five manuals on the making of explosive devices were seized along with the other contraband. Although the police were lawfully in a position to observe the manuals, it is not apparent that they were evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure, and thus their removal prior to the arrival of the search warrant may have been premature. Nevertheless, suppression is not required or authorized in view of the inevitable discovery of these books. Evidence need not be suppressed where it can be shown by a very high degree of probability that the normal course of police investigation would, even absent the illegal police conduct, have inevitably led to the discovery of such evidence. People v. Stith, 69 NY2d 313 (1987); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499 (1973). The doctrine of inevitable discovery is inapplicable to evidence obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the challenged police conduct. People v. Stith, 69 NY2d supra. Here, the police were lawfully in the apartment when they saw the books in plain view on the shelves, thus the only questionable action, was possibly premature recovery. Therefore, since the normal course the police investigation, that is the execution of the search warrant, would have led to the recovery of the manuals, the error of removing them before the warrant arrived does not require their suppression. Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431 (1984). See also, People v. Alberti, 111 AD2d 860 (2d Dept. 1985). Accordingly, having found no violation of the defendant's rights by the police entries into his apartment or the seizure of the items therein, the defendt's motion to suppress physical evidence is denied in its entirety. Finally, as to the defendant's statement, the People have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of the alleged statement. The two officers present when defendant was placed under arrest offered contradictory testimony with respect to whether or not the defendant made a statement. The one officer who recalled that defendant made a statement could not recall with specificity what that statement was. Thus the People have failed to prove that defendant made a statement or the substance of that statement. Given that defendant thereafter declined to speak to the police in the absence of counsel, the People have failed to meet their burden of establishing the voluntariness of the statement. Therefore, the motion to suppress the statement is granted. This constitutes the opinion, decision and order of the court. ------------=D0 ---------------------- Notes (1) While the Court in Horton v. California, 496 US 128 (1990), held that inadvertent discovery is not a prerequisite for invoking the exception, the New York Court of Appeals has yet to analyze this issue as a matter of state constitutional law. Accordingly, this court will follow the principles as set forth in Coolidge.

Hank with  his  friends  in the  Queens Democrats...
Little  do they know they are hanging out with a
a neo-Nazi -skanking -lowlife  WHO  LOVES TO HARASS 
UNDERAGE  KIDS WITH SEXUAL INNUENDOS..
NO ONE SHOULD HANG OUT WITH  THIS NAZI SICKIE!!
 _________________________________________________________________ Copyright 1996, The New York Law Publishing Company. All Rights Reserved.

HANGING FROM A NOOSELINE IS A 
SKANK NAMED HANK NUESSLEIN

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